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I defend the actualist higher-order thought theory against four objections. The first 
objection contends that the theory is circular. The second one contends that the 
theory is unable to account for the alleged epistemic position we are in with respect 
to our own conscious mental states. The third one contends that the theory is una-
ble to account for the evidence we have for the proposition that all conscious men-
tal states are represented. The fourth one contends that the theory does not accom-
modate the intimacy we have with our own conscious mental states. To some ex-
tent, my defense will be heterodox, in the sense that I will show that some objec-
tions are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to the objectors a point that 
higher-order theorists do not seem to be willing to concede, that is, that the theory 
is the result of conceptual analysis. 
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1   Introduction 
 
Higher-order theories of consciousness have an almost paradoxical status: they are in-
spired by a principle that sounds offhand plausible, but they have also been bombar-
ded with a volley of objections.1 The relevant principle is the so-called transitivity prin-
ciple (see Rosenthal 2000): it says that conscious mental states are states we are con-
scious of. Starting from this “insight,” as it is often referred to, higher-order theorists 
have developed different and competing accounts of what it is for a mental state to be 
a conscious state. Given the high level of refinement that these accounts have reached, 
and given the high number of attacks that have been made on them, it is useful to 
follow Carruthers (2016) in distinguishing between generic and local objections: the first 
ones are those leveled at higher-order theories as such; the second ones are those leve-
led at this or that variant of higher-order theories. 
In this paper, I will defend a particular variant of the higher-order theory against a 
limited number of objections. The higher-order theory I will defend is the actualist hi-
gher-order thought theory, in its original formulation. Roughly, such theory has it that 
our mental states are conscious just in case we have an assertoric thought about them. 
The most prominent advocate of this theory is David Rosenthal. The local objections I 
will try to disarm are four. I will refer to them as the circularity objection, the first episte-
mic objection, the second epistemic objection, and the intimacy objection respectively. The 
circularity objection, raised by Rowlands (2001), contends that the theory is circular at 
its core. The first epistemic objection, raised by Goldman (2002), contends that the 
theory is unable to accommodate the alleged evidence we automatically have when 
our states are conscious. The second epistemic objection, raised by Kriegel (2009a, 
2009b), contends that the theory cannot account for the evidence we have for a certain 
(universal) proposition about consciousness. The intimacy objection, raised by several 
scholars, contends that the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have with 
our own conscious mental states.2 
All the foregoing objections have been already explicitly addressed: the first two 
objections have been dealt with by Carruthers (2016), the second epistemic objection 
has been appraised by Levine (2010) and van Gulick (2012), and the intimacy objection 
 
1 For a survey, see Carruthers (2016). 
2 As it is raised by different authors, this objection comes in varying forms. I will rely on the form that 




has been recently scrutinized by Rosenthal (2018) himself. Nevertheless, I believe that 
there is still room for an assessment. Concerning the objections raised by Goldman and 
Rowlands, I will argue that they are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to 
the objectors a point that Carruthers and other higher-order theorists do not seem 
willing to concede, that is, that theory is the result of conceptual analysis. In this sense, 
my defense will be heterodox. Akin considerations apply to my defense against the 
intimacy objection: I will argue that Rosenthal’s reply is deficient and put forward a 
refined one. Concerning the second epistemic objection, the existing replies are prior 
to Kriegel’s (2012) prompt counter-response, which has not yet been assessed and is 
worth considering.  
Before beginning a remark is in order. Recently, friends of the actualist HOT theory 
have proposed to construe it with a novel form, especially because they have taken the 
possibility of higher-order thoughts to cause trouble. The novel formulation is com-
monly labeled as the “non-relational” formulation of the actualist HOT theory (see 
notably Berger 2014; Brown 2015; Gottlieb forthcoming) and is contrasted with the ori-
ginal formulation (see Carruthers 2016), which is labeled—not uncontroversially—as 
“relational.”3 Roughly, on the novel formulation, the theory turns out to be a theory of 
creature consciousness,4 whereas on the original formulation the theory is a theory of 
state consciousness (I will clarify these notions along the way). As I said, I will defend 
the theory in its original formulation. I believe that such a defense is worth making for 
two reasons. The first one, that I cannot develop here for reasons of space, is that the 
conclusion that the possibility of false higher-order thoughts causes trouble for the 
 
3 For instance, Gottlieb (forthcoming) writes: “HOT theory is often framed in relational terms, where, for 
any first-order perceptual state M of a subject S, M is […] conscious at t iff S harbours a suitable HOT 
M* that represents M at t.” It is not clear what would make a HOT theory “relational.” Sometimes it 
seems it is the fact that the theory says that a relation between the higher-order state and the first-order 
state always obtains (see Brown 2015, p. 1785; Gottlieb forthcoming). But the original formulation of the 
theory does not say that. Sometimes it seems it is the fact that the theory says that the existence (viz. 
occurrence) of the first-order state is a necessary condition for its being a conscious state (see Brown 2015, 
p. 1792). But again, the original formulation of the theory does not say that. As the original formulation 
is the formulation that Rosenthal still holds (see the quotation below), there seems to be no reason to 
regard the latter as “relational.” Thanks to David Rosenthal for a useful exchange on this point. 
4 For instance, Gottlieb (forthcoming) formulates the actualist HOT theory as follows: “For any subject S, 
S’s being in a suitable higher-order mental representation M* (an assertoric and de se HOT) is necessary 
and sufficient for S’s being phenomenally conscious.” (emphasis mine) 
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original formulation of the theory can be disputed.5 The second one is that the original 
formulation is the formulation that the creator of the theory—David Rosenthal—still 
holds. With his more recent words: 
 
Being aware of a state is necessary for that state to be conscious, but it is not suffi-
cient. Still, we can begin to close in on a sufficient condition by determining how 
one must be aware of a state for that state to be conscious. I’ve argued elsewhere 
[…] that the required type of awareness consists in one’s having a thought that one 
is in that state. (Rosenthal forthcoming) 
 
The architecture of the paper is as follows. §2 presents the basics of the actualist HOT 
theory and briefly discusses its nature. §3 is devoted to the circularity objection. §4 and 
§5 are devoted to the two epistemic objections. §6 is devoted to the intimacy objection. 
The final section sums up the results.  
  
2   The actualist higher-order thought theory 
 
We use the predicate “conscious” to denote different properties. Accordingly, we have 
to make some preliminary distinctions. First, we may ascribe consciousness both to 
creatures (individuals) and mental states: creature consciousness is the property of a 
creature’s being conscious; state consciousness is the property of a state’s being con-
scious. Consider the following two sentences: 
 
(1) Mary is conscious. 
(2) Mary’s thought about her son is conscious. 
 
While (1) expresses creature consciousness (it means that Mary is awake), (2) expresses 
state consciousness (it means that Mary is aware that she is thinking about her son).  
Second, creature consciousness admits two variants (see Rosenthal 1986): intransi-
tive consciousness is the property of being conscious; transitive consciousness is the 
property of being conscious of something. Consider the following three sentences: 
 
5 I limit myself to saying what follows: the issue seems to be that there is a tension between the original 
formulation of the theory, the possibility of false higher-order thoughts, and the assumption that aware-
ness is factive. However, it is clear from Rosenthal’s writings that he deliberately uses “aware of” and 
“conscious of” in a non-factive sense (see especially Rosenthal 2005, p. 112 n12). In this paper I will stick 
to this use. In any case, to resolve the tension it is sufficient to amend the theory as follows: one’s mental 
state is conscious if and only if one has a veridical thought to the effect that one is in that mental state. 
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(1) Mary is conscious. 
(2) Mary’s thought about her son is conscious. 
(3) Mary is conscious of her own thought about her son. 
 
While (1) and (2) express intransitive consciousness, (3) expresses transitive consciou-
sness. Note that while we may ascribe intransitive consciousness both to creatures and 
mental states, we may not ascribe transitive consciousness to mental states. Consider: 
 
(4) Mary’s thought is conscious of her son. 
 
Sentences like (4) are ungrammatical (or at least nonsensical; see Kriegel 2009b, p. 27).  
How do higher-order theories of consciousness account for state consciousness?6 
First, higher-order theories explain state consciousness in terms of transitive consciou-
sness. These theories are centered on the so-called transitivity principle, which can be 
put as follows: if S’s M is conscious, then S is conscious of M—where “S” stands for 
“subject” (or creature) and “M” stands for “mental state” (here and henceforth). Ac-
cordingly, our conscious mental states are those states we are conscious of, whereas 
our unconscious mental states are those states we are not conscious of.  
Second, higher-order theories explain transitive consciousness in terms of represen-
tation. They say that if x is conscious of y, then x represents y. Representations may be 
of different sorts. Higher-order theorists disagree on what sort of representation is the 
higher-order one: according to the higher-order perception theory, the representation 
which makes a state conscious is perception-like (see, e.g., Lycan 1996), whereas accor-
ding to the higher-order thought theory, the representation which makes a state con-
scious is a thought (see, e.g., Rosenthal 1997). 
Finally, the higher-order thought (HOT) theory branches out into two variants. The 
actualist HOT theory says that S’s M is conscious if and only if S has a thought to the 
effect that S is in M. The dispositionalist HOT theory says that S’s M is conscious if and 
 
6 In the literature state consciousness is often said to admit of two variants: if there is “something it is 
like” to be in a mental state, then we speak of phenomenal consciousness; if the content of that mental 
state is available for various cognitive operations, then we speak of access consciousness (see Block 1995). 
As for Rosenthal, it seems that he simply rejects the distinction at issue (see Rosenthal 2005, p. 192; 
Wilberg 2010, p. 625).  
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only if S is disposed to have a thought to the effect that S is in M. Call the foregoing 
formulation of the actualist HOT theory the core claim of the actualist HOT theorist.7  
The actualist HOT theorist also commits herself to claims that do not follow from 
the core claim. Indeed, she not only say that (a) what makes a mental state M conscious 
is that M is the object of a mental state (to be precise, a thought) but also what follows: 
(b) the higher-order state can be (and normally is) unconscious and (c) the higher-order 
state neither is identical nor belongs to the lower-order state. All these claims have been 
seen as breeding infelicitous consequences for the actualist HOT theory: (a) is regarded 
by Rowlands (2001) as what renders the actualist HOT theory circular. (b) is taken by 
Goldman (2002) and Kriegel (2009a, 2009b) as what makes the relevant theory unsati-
sfactory. Goldman argues that (b) makes the theory unable to account for the epistemic 
position we are in with respect to our own conscious mental states; Kriegel argues that 
(b) makes the relevant theory unable to account for the evidence we have for the pro-
position that all conscious mental states are represented. As for (c), it is considered by 
many scholars the reason why the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have 
with our own conscious mental states.  
To deal with these critiques, as well as with the replies that have been given to them, 
one has to consider the following question: what kind of theory is the actualist HOT 
theory? According to Byrne (1997, p. 103), any higher-order theory is meant to provide 
a reductive analysis of state consciousness, that is: any higher-order theory aims to pro-
vide an account that gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a mental state to be 
conscious that do not presuppose the notion of state consciousness.8 Rowlands (2001, 
p. 291) and Goldman (2002, p. 117) agree, but ask a question: is the actualist HOT 
theory the result of conceptual analysis, or is it something else? Both suggest that there 
are strong reasons to presume that the actualist HOT theory is, at least partly, a result 
of conceptual analysis. Rowlands (2001, p. 295) draws our attention to the fact that in 
 
7 Note that this is a simplified formulation of the theory, for if one looks at Rosenthal’s work (notably 
Rosenthal 1986), one finds at least three further conditions for a state to be conscious: the causal condi-
tion, according to which the lower-order state causes the higher-order thought; the immediacy condition, 
according to which the higher-order thought is arrived at non-inferentially; and the simultaneity condi-
tion, according to which the higher-order thought is (roughly) contemporaneous to the lower-order 
state. The causal condition has been retracted by Rosenthal (1993, p. 218 n16), and none of these condi-
tions is relevant for current purposes. This is why I dare to work with a simplified formulation. 
8 Carruthers (1996, p. 165) seems to present his higher-order theory as a recursive one. However, Carru-
thers (2016) seems to hold that higher-order theories are reductive in nature. 
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setting out the theory Rosenthal explicitly tries to safeguard it against triviality (or bet-
ter, circularity), whereas Goldman (2002, p. 134 n2) draws our attention to the way the 
theory is formulated, which according to him makes it sound close to a definition.  
What about Rosenthal’s stance? He explicitly denies that his theory expresses a con-
ceptual truth. He describes the actualist HOT theory not as a definition, but rather as 
a hypothesis. In his words:  
 
Since the theory relies for support on its explanatory advantages, it doesn’t appeal 
to, nor is it intended to reflect, any conceptual or metaphysically necessary truths. 
The claim that conscious mental states are states we’re conscious of ourselves as 
being in by having HOTs [higher-order thoughts] about them is a theoretical claim 
justified by its explanatory power, not a metaphysical truth or a result of concep-
tual analysis. (Rosenthal 2005, p. 9) 
 
Yet, I think that the Rowlands-Goldman reading has to be taken seriously. First, be-
cause it does not make sense to try to safeguard a theory against circularity—as Ro-
senthal in fact does—if that theory is not even partly conceptual. Second, because it is 
not entirely clear what a “theoretical claim justified by its explanatory power” would 
be. At any rate, I will limit myself to arguing along the following lines: even if the ac-
tualist HOT theory were the result of conceptual analysis, it would still be immune to 
the objections raised by Rowlands and Goldman.  
 
3   The circularity objection 
 
We know that higher-order theorists try to explain state consciousness in terms of tran-
sitive consciousness. As they use consciousness to explain consciousness, one could 
object that such theories are circular.9 However, the higher-order theorist can draft the 
following rejoinder: the consciousness that figures in the explanans is not the consciou-
sness that figures in the explanandum. He can argue for this difference by pointing out, 
for instance, that while intransitive consciousness applies both to creatures and mental 
states, transitive consciousness applies only to creatures. Still, one could reply that cir-
cularity is just around the corner. Consider again the core claim of the actualist HOT 
theory: S’s M is conscious if and only if S has a thought to the effect that S is in M. As 
 
9 In the following I assume the common (and perhaps naïve) view on circularity, one on which the 




it can be seen, the actualist HOT theory explains state consciousness by invoking men-
tal states. More precisely: it explains state consciousness in terms of a relation that a 
mental state bears to another one.  
Rosenthal (1997, p. 735) is perfectly aware of the danger. In this regard, he says that 
if all states were conscious, then the actualist HOT theory would be circular. Is he right 
about that? It is not obvious: if one takes both “all states are conscious” and “a con-
scious mental state is a state that is the object of a mental state” to be conceptual truths 
(by modeling the first one on “all bachelor are unmarried”), then one may conclude 
that the actualist HOT theory is circular, for on this view the concept of mental state 
entails the concept of state consciousness. This would be expressed by “if x is mental, 
then x is conscious” or by “mental states are essentially conscious.” By contrast, if one 
does not take “all states are conscious” to be a conceptual truth, then there is still room 
for avoiding circularity. Indeed, one could hold “all states are conscious” to be a result 
of observation (by modeling it on “all ravens are black”), and if the claim that all states 
are conscious is made on such a basis, then one will face a problem of infinite regress 
(of mental states), not a problem of circularity.  
Either way, Rosenthal is not in trouble, for he holds that not all states are conscious. 
As Carruthers (2016) aptly remarks, this is one of the main motivations of the higher-
order theory. However, one could point out that the actualist HOT theorist needs 
something more to avoid circularity. Indeed, she must deny that both of the following 
theses express a conceptual truth: 
 
(i) All states are conscious. 
(ii) All thoughts are conscious.  
 
For if one takes both “all thoughts are conscious” and “a conscious mental state is a 
state that is the object of a thought” to be conceptual truths, then one still faces cir-
cularity, since on this view the concept of thought entails the concept of state con-
sciousness (this would be expressed by “if x is a thought, then x is conscious” or by 
“thoughts are essentially conscious”).10 Yet, one can define thought without referring 
to state consciousness.11 As Rosenthal denies that (i) and (ii) are conceptually true, one 
could say that the actualist HOT theory is immune to the circularity objection.  
 
10 Again, if one holds “all thoughts are conscious” to be a result of observation, then one will face a 
problem of infinite regress (of thoughts), not a problem of circularity. 
11 For instance, one could say that x is a thought if and only if x has an intentional object. I am not 
endorsing this view, but rather merely pointing out that other definitions are available.  
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Rowlands, though, contends that in order to avoid circularity we need even more. 
In his words, one needs to establish that “there are no logical connections at all be-
tween mental states and consciousness.” What does he mean by “logical connection”? 
His answer is as follows: if X is logically connected to Y, then the concept of X “entails 
the concept” (Rowlands 2001, p. 296) of Y. Alternatively: if X is logically connected to 
Y, then the understanding of the concept of X “requires the understanding of the 
concept” (Rowlands 2001, p. 297) of Y. According to Rowlands, not only are there 
“logical connections” between higher-order thoughts and state consciousness but there 
are also logical connections between mental states and state consciousness. This, cou-
pled with the highly plausible thesis that logical connections are transitive, would 
make the actualist HOT theory a circular theory. But what would these “logical con-
nections” be? Rowlands writes: 
 
It might be claimed that while no mental states are essentially conscious, neverthe-
less all mental states are essentially such that they could become conscious. Or, we 
might weaken this still further and claim that while no mental states are essentially 
conscious, and while at least some mental states are such that they could never 
become conscious, nevertheless, for any token mental state M, M is a token of the 
same type as other tokens which are or could become conscious. […] Admittedly, 
this connection is not as straightforward as the implausible ‘all mental states must 
be conscious’ variety. But it is a logical connection nonetheless, and thus threatens 
the HOT model with circularity no less than the more straightforward version. 
(Rowlands 2001, pp. 297–298) 
 
In this context, we may replace “could become” with “can be.” Thus, according to 
Rowlands the “logical connection” between mental states and state consciousness is 
not only expressed by the thesis that all states are conscious, but also by the following 
further thesis: 
 
(iii) All states can be conscious.12 
 
And this is a thesis that Rosenthal does not deny.  
Carruthers (2016) tries to disarm the relevant objection right away. For him, the 
objection fails simply because the actualist HOT theory is not the result of conceptual 
 
12 Actually, Rowlands (2001, p. 297) puts forwards another “candidate” besides (iii), but this detail is 
not germane to my discussion. Note that Rowlands’ (2001, pp. 295–298) usage of “essentially” is not 
always calibrated.  
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analysis. Is such a reply effective? Rowlands (2001, p. 292) would say no, for he holds 
that even in case the theory is not a conceptual truth, his objection can still jeopardize 
it. I do not want to assess these two positions. I will limit myself to showing that even 
if the actualist HOT theory is construed as a conceptual thesis, it is still not circular.  
Since Rowlands holds that (iii) expresses a “logical connection,” we must infer that 
he implicitly subscribes to the following thesis: if all X can be Y, then the concept of Y 
entails the concept of Y. Alternatively: if all X can be Y, then the understanding of the 
concept of X requires the understanding of the concept of Y. Hence Rowlands argues 
that since from (iii) it follows that all thoughts can be conscious, and logical connec-
tions are transitive, then the actualist HOT theory is circular. Now the question is: are 
we compelled to accept Rowlands’ thesis? That is: is the view that “all X can be Y” 
implies that the concept of X entails the concept of Y compelling? There is a strong 
reason to answer negatively, I take it. For one might rather embrace a view according 
to which a property Y of an object X is essential to X if and only if X must have Y to be 
what it is (see Fine 1994). On such a view, “X can be Y” does not imply that the concept 
of X entails the concept of Y. Compare: just as “all bachelors could become CEOs of 
Apple” does not imply that the concept of bachelor entails the concept of Apple CEO 
(or that the understanding of the concept of bachelor requires the understanding of the 
concept of Apple CEO), “all mental states could become conscious” does not imply 
that the concept of mental state entails the concept of consciousness (or that the under-
standing of the concept of mental state requires the understanding of the concept of 
state consciousness).     
At this point, Rowlands could acknowledge that his view about concept entailment 
is disputable, but insist—quite strangely, in my view—that (iii) would still render Ro-
senthal’s theory circular. To this one could reply that Rowlands is pitching the stan-
dards of informativeness too high. Consider the relational analysis of being a parent: X 
is a parent just in case there is some Y, distinct from X, such that X is either a father of 
Y or the mother of Y. Now, Y could certainly become a parent on his turn. Does this 
render the definition circular? I believe it does not. If you find the foregoing example 
questionable, then consider also the notorious reductive analysis of knowledge: p is 
known just in case p is the object of a justified true belief.13 Now, beliefs could be 
 
13 While in the previous case the analogy was conscious mental state : higher-order thought = parent : 
child, here the analogy is conscious mental state : higher-order thought = knowledge : belief. It is implicit 
that one can define belief without referring to knowledge. For instance, one may say that x is a belief if 
and only if x is a mental state with assertoric attitude. 
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known as well (indeed, we are capable of self-knowledge). Does this render the defi-
nition circular? I believe that it does not. And it is reasonable to presume that on Row-
lands’ standards, too many definitions would turn out to be circular.  
 
4   The first epistemic objection  
 
The actualist HOT theorist claims that our states are conscious just in case we have a 
thought to the effect that we, ourselves, are in those states. The theory does not say 
that our higher-order thoughts must be conscious too. On the contrary, the actualist 
HOT theorist holds that most of our higher-order thoughts are unconscious. And that 
a higher-order thought T is unconscious means, of course, that we do not have a 
thought T* to the effect that we, ourselves, are in T. How is the actualist HOT theorist 
driven to this position? According to Goldman (2002, p. 118), the reasons are two: the 
threat of infinite regress, and the evidence that we rarely reflect on our mental sta-
tes14—where the first reason is regarded by Goldman as the main one.15  
Whatever the reason is, Goldman (2002, p. 118) has a problem with the claim that 
an unconscious higher-order thought can make something conscious. He not only con-
siders the relevant claim “quite counter-intuitive,”16 but he also argues that by allo-
wing higher-order thoughts to be unconscious, the actualist HOT theory turns out to 
be unable to account for the “distinctive epistemic position” we are in with respect to 
our own conscious mental states. The “distinctive epistemic position” Goldman has in 
mind is expressed by the following thesis: whenever we have a thought to the effect 
that we, ourselves, are in a certain mental state M, we “automatically have good evi-
dence for believing” that M is conscious—where “having good evidence for believing 
that p” can be replaced by “being in a good epistemic position to tell that p is true.” 
 
14 For Rosenthal (2005), higher-order thoughts become conscious only when we introspect. More preci-
sely, a higher-order thought is conscious just in case we have a third-order thought, i.e., a thought about 
the thought to the effect that we, ourselves, are in a certain mental state. More on this in §5.  
15 Yet, when one looks at Rosenthal’s works (especially Rosenthal 2005, p. 184), it seems that the actualist 
HOT theorist arrives at the relevant claim by observing that we rarely engage ourselves in introspection. 
On this basis, she denies that her theory is threatened by the infinite regress problem.  
16 The idea that an unconscious mental state can make conscious another mental state is held to be highly 
problematic in itself by more than one scholar (see, e.g., Smith 1986, p. 150; Rowlands 2001, pp. 304–
305). Still, others do not see anything wrong with it (see, e.g., Aquila 1990, p. 81; Byrne 1997, pp. 107–
108). I concur with the latter. 
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Goldman (2002, p. 118) maintains that a theory of state consciousness ought to accom-
modate the fact that we are in the foregoing epistemic position, and contends that the 
actualist HOT theory does not do that. He writes: 
 
When you are in a conscious mental state M—at least a salient, nonfringy con-
scious mental state—then you automatically have good evidence for believing that 
this state is conscious. If you are consciously thinking about Vienna, for example, 
that very thinking gives you excellent evidence for the proposition that this 
thought is conscious. […] How does the HOT theory make sense of the fact that 
one automatically has good evidence for the fact that these states are conscious? 
Since what makes them conscious is the existence of independent, non-conscious 
mental states, one could only have automatic evidence for the consciousness of the 
first-order states if one automatically had evidence for the existence of those non-
conscious HOTs [higher-order thoughts]. But why should such evidence automa-
tically be available? (Goldman 2002, pp. 118–119) 
 
We may rephrase “automatically” with “just in virtue of the fact that,” and hence say 
that Goldman’s attack rests on the following premises:  
 
(P1) S has good evidence for believing that S’s mental state M is conscious just in virtue of 
the fact that M is conscious. 
(P2) S has good evidence for believing that S’s mental state M is conscious only if S’s thought 
about M is conscious. 
 
Where P2 could be rephrased with “S has good has evidence for believing that S’s 
mental state M is conscious only if S has good evidence for believing that S has a 
thought about M.” Goldman concludes that it cannot be that most of our higher-order 
thoughts are unconscious—a conclusion that glaringly contradicts the view of the ac-
tualist HOT theorist.  
Goldman (2002, p. 135 n6) makes clear that his argument has force only if the actua-
list HOT theory expresses a conceptual truth. He makes the following point: if “all x’s 
are F” expresses a conceptual truth (like “all bachelors are unmarried”), then one can-
not have evidence for something being x without having evidence for its being F. By 
contrast, if “all x’s are F” expresses a contingent truth (like “all water is H2O”), then 
one can have evidence for something being x without having evidence for its being F. 
Indeed, it is often argued that while you cannot know that Peter is a bachelor without 
knowing that Peter is unmarried, you can still know that the liquid in the glass is water 
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without knowing that water is H2O. Accordingly, if “S’s M is conscious” is extensio-
nally equivalent to “S has a thought to the effect that S is in M,” then one cannot have 
evidence for S’s M being conscious without having evidence for S to have a thought to 
the effect that S is in M.  
As we know, Goldman thinks that the actualist HOT theory is best understood as a 
definition. Hence, he also thinks that his objection cuts against Rosenthal’s view. Once 
again, Carruthers (2016) tries to disarm the objection by rejecting the reading of the 
theory. He claims that the actualist HOT theory is an “empirical theory.” As such, he 
states, it expresses a truth like “all water is H2O.” Thus, Carruthers’ attempt to reject 
P2 implicitly relies on the following analogy: conscious mental states are to higher-
order thoughts as water is to H2O.17 But if it is so, Carruthers goes on, then we can 
know that our mental states are conscious without knowing that we have a thought to 
the effect that we, ourselves, are in those mental states. Still, one could follow a diffe-
rent path: instead of trying to reject P2, one can try to reject P1.18 Such a reply does not 
hinge on the denial of Goldman’s reading of the actualist HOT theory. Rather, I submit, 
it works even if the actualist HOT theory does express a conceptual truth.  
For recall, P1 says that one has good evidence for believing that one’s mental state 
M is conscious just in virtue of the fact that M is conscious. For instance: you have good 
evidence for believing that your seeing red is conscious just in virtue of the fact that 
you are consciously seeing red.19 Is the actualist HOT theorist compelled to accept such 
a view? Let us look at the details of her theory.  
First, on the theory, a mental state is conscious just in case one has a thought to the 
effect that one is, oneself, in that state. Consider a conscious seeing. Using angle brac-
kets, we can represent the mental content of the higher-order thought as follows:  
 
 
17 One might wonder whether the advanced analogy is convincing. For one could contend that it is more 
natural to say that water is to H2O as state consciousness is to the neural substrates (viz. the cortical 
regions) associated with it. This would not amount to denying that the actualist HOT theory can receive 
experimental support (on this, see Rosenthal 2005, p. 229; Weisberg 2020, pp. 450–452). 
18 Carruthers (2016) subscribes to P1. He says that whenever I have a conscious pain, I “surely know that 
the pain is conscious.” In the following I will show that the actualist HOT theorist is not compelled to 
accept such a thesis. 
19 Following Kriegel (2009b, pp. 25, 26 n7, 32), I use the suffix “-ly” in a way that “Mary consciously 
thinks of x” is equivalent to “Mary’s thought of x is conscious.” Thus, in such a framework “Mary con-
sciously represents her first-order state” will be equivalent to “Mary’s second-order state (about her 
first-order state) is conscious.” 
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⟨I, myself, am seeing red⟩ 
 
In general, the kind of content higher-order thoughts have is the following: 
 
⟨I, myself, am in M⟩ 
As can be seen, the content does not encode the phrase “conscious,” namely, the 
thought does not represent state consciousness. One could hold that a third-order 
thought will encode such expression. But this is not the case. Compare the following 
two mental contents: 
 
⟨I, myself, am seeing red⟩ 
⟨I, myself, am thinking about my seeing red⟩ 
 
The first content is the content of a second-order thought, whereas the second one is 
the content of a third-order thought (see Rosenthal 2005, pp. 27, 113, 292 n17, 298, 344 
n13). As can be seen, neither encodes the phrase “conscious,” namely, neither repre-
sents state consciousness. Ascending the entire hierarchy of orders will not enable us 
to find a content with the relevant phrase, namely, a thought that represents state con-
sciousness. 
Second, on the theory whenever one has a thought to the effect that one is, oneself, 
in a mental state M, it seems to one that one is, oneself, in M. With Rosenthal’s (2011, p. 
431) slogan: “A state’s being conscious is a matter of mental appearance.” For instance: 
whenever I have the thought with the content ⟨I, myself, am seeing red⟩, it seems to me 
that I, myself, am seeing red. However, the actualist HOT theorist does not claim that 
whenever one has a thought to the effect that one is, oneself, in a mental state M, it 
seems to one that one is, oneself, in a conscious M. Alternatively: she does not claim 
that whenever one has a thought to the effect that one is, oneself, in M, it seems to one 
that M is conscious. The reason is precisely that on the theory the content of the higher-
order thought does not encode the phrase “conscious.”20 Compare the following two 
kinds of mental content: 
 
⟨I, myself, am in M⟩ 
⟨I, myself, am in a conscious M⟩ 
 
20 If consciousness were an intrinsic property of mental states, then it might be that by having a thought 
to the effect that one is, oneself, in M, it seems to one that M is conscious (assuming that having a thought 
about x means having a thought about all the intrinsic properties of x). And yet on the actualist HOT 
theory this is not the case. See especially Byrne (1997, p. 107) on that. 
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We may grant Goldman that “S’s M is conscious” is extensionally equivalent to “S has 
a thought to the effect that S is in M.” On this view, ⟨I, myself, am in a conscious M⟩ is 
equivalent to the following kind of content: 
⟨I, myself, am having a thought to the effect that I, myself, am in M⟩ 
 
Well, since the content of higher-order thoughts does not encode the phrase “con-
scious,” that content cannot be equated with ⟨I, myself, am having a thought to the 
effect that I, myself, am in M⟩ either. Hence, the actualist HOT theorist does not even 
claim that whenever one has a thought to the effect that one is, oneself, in a mental 
state M, it seems to one that one is having a thought to the effect that one is, oneself, in 
M.  
Now we may assume for the sake of argument that seemings provide us with a kind 
of evidence, that is to say, that seemings put us in a certain epistemic position. We may 
say that if it seems to one that one is, oneself, in a mental state M, then one has good 
evidence for believing that one is, oneself, in M (namely, one is in a good epistemic 
position to tell that the proposition “I, myself, am in M” is true). For example, we may 
say that if it seems to me that I, myself, am seeing red, then I have good evidence for 
believing that I, myself, am seeing red. The actualist HOT theorist may hold that true, 
but she may also argue along the following lines: one has good evidence for believing 
that one is, oneself, in a conscious mental state M only if it seems to one that one is, 
oneself, in a conscious M; it seems to one that one is, oneself, in a conscious mental 
state M only if the content of one’s mental state about M encodes the phrase “con-
scious.” On the theory, the content of the thought that makes a mental state conscious 
does not encode “conscious.” Therefore, on the theory, P1 does not hold. Of course, 
the actualist HOT theorist may maintain that if one had not had a thought to the effect 
that one is, oneself, in a mental state M, then one could not have good evidence for 
believing that M is conscious, for from this it does not follow that one is in a good 
epistemic position to tell that the proposition “I, myself, am in a mental state M” is true 
just in virtue of the fact that M is conscious.21  
 
 
21 A related objection raised by Goldman (2002, pp. 118–119) is that it is not clear how unconscious 
higher-order thoughts explain why we usually report our conscious mental states as being conscious. 
As Rosenthal (2019, p. 195) rightly notes, though, the objection fails simply because we do not usually 
report our conscious mental states as being conscious—even if we are in them. And an explanation of 
this might be that the contents of our higher-order thoughts do not represent state consciousness. 
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5   The second epistemic objection  
 
Since the actualist HOT theorist explains transitive consciousness in terms of represen-
tation, he holds true the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented. 
Call this proposition Rep. Kriegel (2009a, 2009b) endorses it too, but he asks: what is 
the evidential basis for Rep? He takes into account three kinds of evidence: phenomeno-
logical evidence, conceptual evidence, and experimental evidence. Phenomenological evi-
dence branches out into direct phenomenological evidence and indirect phenomenolo-
gical evidence.22 Then he argues along the following lines: if there is any evidential 
basis for the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented, then this evi-
dential basis is direct phenomenological evidence; but if it is so, then there cannot be 
unconscious higher-order states (or better, second-order states). In Kriegel’s words: if 
the only evidential basis for Rep is direct phenomenological evidence, then “all con-
scious mental states are consciously represented.” Call the thesis under quotation 
marks the hyper-consciousness thesis.23  
As Kriegel’s argument against the actualist HOT theorist is basically an argument 
by elimination, it is possible to block it by showing that at least one evidential basis 
different from direct phenomenological evidence is available. For example: if concep-
tual evidence turns out to be an available evidential basis for the relevant proposition, 
then Kriegel’s argument falls flat.  
A first way to block the argument is precisely to make the move I have just mentio-
ned: there is no need for phenomenology, one could say, for the link between state 
consciousness and representation is guaranteed conceptually.24 Along these lines, one 
could conceive of Rep as structurally akin to “all bachelor are unmarried” or “all vi-
xens are female foxes” (where “conscious mental state” would be to “represented” as 
“bachelor” is to “unmarried” or as “vixen” is to “female fox”). What about the view of 
 
22 To tell the truth, Kriegel considers evidence from philosophical principles as well, but I think that this 
latter can be equated to some degree with conceptual evidence. See also Kriegel (2012, pp. 478–479) on 
that. 
23 One might legitimately ask why I do not adopt Kriegel’s name for this thesis, which is actually “ubi-
quity of inner awareness thesis” (Kriegel 2009b, p. 181). The reason is strictly practical: it is because I 
have found that Kriegel’s name is used in the literature equivocally. For example, Levine (2010) and 
McClelland (2015, p. 2470) call “ubiquity thesis” what Kriegel (2009b, p. 300) would refer to as “aware-
ness thesis.”  
24 This move seems to be made for instance by Lycan (1996). 
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the actualist HOT theorist? The answer is not plain: on the one hand, Rosenthal expli-
citly denies that the actualist HOT theory expresses a conceptual truth; on the other 
hand, such a statement does not rule out that some theses that ground the theory are 
conceptually evident. For one could deny that the link between state consciousness and 
higher-order thoughts is conceptual while still maintaining that the link between state 
consciousness and representation is conceptual. At any rate, what matters here is that the 
actualist HOT theorist allows herself to rely also on introspective input (see Rosenthal 
2005, pp. 9, 130; Weisberg 2020, p. 439). Moving from this suggestion, I will try to show 
that indirect phenomenological evidence is an available evidential basis for Rep. Clear-
ly, assessing whether indirect phenomenological evidence is an available evidential 
basis for Rep makes sense only if one models Rep on non-conceptual truths such as 
“all ravens are black.” On this model, we have that “conscious mental state” is to “rep-
resented” as “raven” is to “black.”  
First of all, let us consider Kriegel’s conditional: he says that if the only evidential 
basis for Rep is direct phenomenological evidence, then all conscious mental states are 
consciously represented. Let us have a look at his distinction between direct and indi-
rect phenomenological evidence. We can state it as follows (see especially Kriegel 
2009b, p. 124):  
 
Direct phenomenological evidence. If S has direct phenomenological evidence for the pro-
position that all x’s are F, then S “sees” each and every x (and “sees” that each and every x 
has F). 
Indirect phenomenological evidence. If S has (only) indirect phenomenological evidence 
for the proposition that all x’s are F, then S does not “see” each and every x.  
 
With a classical example: if S has direct phenomenological evidence for the proposition 
that all ravens are black, then S sees each and every raven (and sees that each and every 
raven is black). If S (only) has indirect phenomenological evidence for that proposition, 
then S does not see each and every raven. Analogously, S has direct phenomenological 
evidence for the relevant proposition only if S “sees” (i.e., is conscious of) all her hi-
gher-order states (or better, all her second-order states). 
Bearing this in mind, let us come back to the actualist HOT theorist. As Kriegel aptly 
reports, she distinguishes between typical cases and non-typical cases: in typical cases, 
first-order states are represented by unconscious second-order states, whereas in non-
typical cases first-order states are represented by conscious second-order states. 
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Hence, the actualist HOT theorist denies that all conscious mental states are con-
sciously represented. For the actualist HOT theorist, conscious mental states are con-
sciously represented only when we introspect.25 As Rosenthal puts it:  
 
Introspection is the special case in which that HOT [higher-order thought] is con-
scious, which happens when a yet higher-order thought occurs—a third-order 
thought about the second-order thought. (Rosenthal 2005, p. 113) 
 
Now, in order to deal with Kriegel’s critique, one has to assume that introspecting is 
something more than merely having a third-order thought; one has to conceive of in-
trospection as something that enables us to find the properties of our conscious states 
(see, e.g., Kriegel 2009a, p. 364). In such a framework, just as the biologist arrives at 
“all ravens are black” by induction, the actualist HOT theorist could arrive at Rep by 
induction. Her inductive inference could be thus (let “→” be a symbol for induction): 
 
(Inf1) “All introspected first-order conscious Ms are represented” → “All first-order conscious Ms 
are represented” 
 
Kriegel’s (2009b, p. 119) attack is directed precisely towards the validity of Inf1. First, 
he argues that the inductive sample of the actualist HOT theorist is biased, for “what 
makes a conscious mental state belong to the sample is that that mental state is repre-
sented in introspection.” He makes this point also in the following impressionistic 
terms: “the introspecting itself constitutes the representing” (see also Kriegel 2009a, p. 
367). Second, he argues that if the inductive inference is warranted for Rep, then it is 
warranted for the hyper-consciousness thesis as well, for “all the instances in the sam-
ple are consciously represented” (see also Kriegel 2009a, p. 367 n20). Is Kriegel’s criti-
que compelling? Let us address his sub-objections one by one. 
 
25 According to Kriegel’s reconstruction of the actualist HOT theorist’s model of introspection, we have 
that when a subject S represents a second-order mental state (i.e., when S is in an introspective mental 
state), then S represents the first-order mental state as well. For example: when I represent my state 
about my seeing of the sky, then I represent the seeing of the sky as well. This is why Kriegel can write 
that in introspection first-order conscious mental states are consciously represented. Even though in 
this context I buy Kriegel’s reconstruction, I still harbour doubts as to its faithfulness. In effect, in some 
footnotes Rosenthal (2005, pp. 292 n17, 344 n14) points out that his concept of introspection “short cir-
cuits the explicit hierarchy” of lower-order mental states: he claims that in introspecting an introspec-
tion—if you want: in having a fourth-order mental state—it is unlikely that we represent the relevant 
second- and first-order mental states. On the contrary, it is very likely that that we simply represent the 
third-order one. One might thus expect that this apply to third-order mental states as well. 
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Concerning the first sub-objection, Levine (2010) and Van Gulick (2012) claim that 
there is no reason to think introspection is responsible for “introducing” the second-
order mental state.26 In particular, Van Gulick remarks that the structure of Inf1 is the 
same as the structure of any scientific inference. In the following, I will show that the 
Levine-Van Gulick intuition is not only correct but also resists Kriegel’s reply to it. This 
latter is given in the following passage: 
 
Yet the fundamental flaw in the inductive argument under consideration is not 
just that it proceeds from the observed to the unobserved, but that the property 
projected through it pertains precisely to being observed. Compare: one can justi-
fiably infer from the fact that all observed swans are white that all swans are white, 
but one cannot justifiably infer from the fact all observed swans are observed that 
all swans are observed; from the fact that all observed swans are at an eyeshot from 
an observer that all swans are at an eyeshot from an observer; from the fact that all 
observed swans are perceptually represented that all swans are perceptually re-
presented. The problem with the inference from the fact that all introspected con-
scious mental states are represented to the fact that all conscious mental states are 
represented is that it is structurally akin to these obviously fallacious inferences.27 
(Kriegel 2012, p. 479)  
 
Hence, for Kriegel the inference made by the actualist HOT theorist is not akin to the 
following: 
 
(Inf2) “All observed ravens are black” → “All ravens are black” 
 
26 Actually, Levine (2010) arrives at this conclusion by arguing that what we are conscious of in intro-
spection is not the introspection itself, but rather the second-order mental state (and perhaps the first-
order one as well). Still, it is hard to me to see how such a remark would disprove Kriegel’s first sub-
objection. 
27 In writing that the flaw of the argument is not just that it proceeds from the observed to the unobser-
ved, Kriegel suggests that in this context what is problematic is the induction as such. Yet, not only is 
such an objection absent in his original examination of indirect phenomenological evidence but it also 
collides with his own way of proceeding: in effect, Kriegel (2009b, p. 123) acknowledges that he himself 
arrives at Rep inferentially, for phenomenological evidence (either direct or indirect) cannot directly 
support universal propositions. His inference, though, is not an inductive inference, but rather an infe-
rence to the best explanation. It is a two-step inference: first, he reasons that since all his conscious mental 
states are represented, it must the case that all others’ conscious mental states are represented as well. 
Second, he reasons that since all conscious mental states of (normal adult) humans are represented, it 
must be the case that all (actual or merely possible) conscious mental states are represented. For an 
assessment of such an inference, see Mehta (2013). 
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but rather to the following: 
 
(Inf3) “All observed ravens are observed” → “All ravens are observed” 
 
where the observation is to the ravens as the introspection is to conscious mental states. 
Now our question is: is the inference made by the actualist HOT theorist really like Inf3? 
Or better still: do we have any reason to say that the inference made by the actualist 
HOT theorist is not like Inf2? Let us see whether it is the case.  
By introspecting we find that conscious first-order mental states have the property 
“being represented.” But represented by what? An answer is to say that by introspec-
ting we find a second-order mental state which represents a first-order mental state. 
More precisely: by performing an introspection directed to a non-introspective mental 
state, we do not find the relation between a third-order state and a second-order state, but 
rather the relation between a second-order state and a first-order state. Why should we 
think that this answer is not viable? It seems that nothing prevents the actualist HOT 
theorist to give such an answer. He can say that what makes a first-order conscious 
mental state M belongs to the sample is not that M is represented in introspection, but 
rather that M is represented by a second-order mental state. Indeed, in the actualist 
HOT theorist’s framework, introspected first-order mental states are represented by 
the introspective state, but they are not represented only by the introspective state, for 
they are already represented by second-order mental states as well. If this is true, then 
the actualist HOT theorist does not project the property “being observed,” but rather 
the property “being represented by second-order mental states.” In Kriegel’s impres-
sionistic words: the introspecting constitutes the representing of second-order mental 
states, but it does not constitute the representing of first-order mental states.28 We can 
thus reformulate the inference made by the actualist HOT theorist in more fine-grained 
terms: 
 
(Inf4) “All introspected first-order conscious Ms are represented by second-order Ms” → “All first-
order conscious Ms are represented by second-order Ms” 
 
To put it briefly, Kriegel’s first objection is plagued by an erroneous conflation of two 
orders of representation. 
 
28 This is why the following (inductive) inference would be unwarranted: “All introspected second-order 
Ms are represented in introspection” → “All second-order Ms are represented in introspection.” 
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Now consider the second sub-objection. Recall that Kriegel says that since “all the 
instances in the sample are consciously represented,” one may inductively infer thus: 
 
(Inf5) “All introspected first-order conscious Ms are represented by conscious second-order Ms” → 
“All first-order conscious Ms are represented by conscious second-order Ms” 
 
It would be as though we were making the following inference: 
 
(Inf6) “All observed ravens are black” → “All ravens are black and observed” 
 
Where one may replace “raven” with “conscious mental state,” “observed” with “in-
trospected” and “black” with “represented.” Inf6 would be warranted only in case, 
whenever we observe a raven, we find both the property “black” and the property 
“being observed.” By the same token, Inf5 would be warranted only in case, whenever 
we introspect, we find both the introspective state (or better, the property “being in-
trospected”) and the second-order mental state (or better, the property “being repre-
sented by second-order mental states”). But on the actualist HOT theorist’s model, this 
is simply not the case. Therefore, the actualist HOT theorist can say that the inference 
from “all introspected first-order conscious mental states are represented” to Rep is 
warranted without being forced to say that the inference from “all introspected first-
order conscious mental states are represented” to the hyper-consciousness thesis is 
warranted.  
Clearly, Kriegel’s set of base cases is larger than the actualist HOT theorist’s one, for 
the former consists of all his second-order mental states. But of course, we cannot iden-
tify an evidential basis for a proposition only because it is the strongest one, for our 
question is precisely whether we “see” (i.e., are conscious of) each and every instance 
of second-order mental state. Compare: we cannot say that we observe each and every 
raven only because this would make “all ravens are black” safer, for the simple reason 
that our question is precisely whether we observe each and every raven. 
 
6   The intimacy objection 
 
The intimacy objection is the most widespread objection against the actualist HOT 
theory: it has been raised and elaborated by some scholars (see Neander 1998; Levine 
2001; Kriegel 2003) and over the years has been cited by other scholars as a strong 
motivation for abandoning higher-order theories in favor of alternative views (see, 
e.g., Brook & Raymont 2006; Horgan et al. 2006; Kriegel 2009b; Block 2011). 
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The objectors charge that the actualist HOT theory does not accommodate the “in-
timacy” we have with our own conscious mental states (see McClelland 2020, p. 462; 
the term “intimacy” comes from Levine 2001, Chap. 6). The intimacy thesis can be put 
as follows: whenever we are conscious of a mental state M, we are in M. In other words, 
in being in a higher-order state we err neither with respect to the properties of the lower-
order state (this is called “qualitative intimacy”) nor with respect to the very existence 
of the lower-order state (this is called “existential intimacy”). Briefly, the intimacy the-
sis might be put as follows: inner misrepresentation cannot occur (see also Rosenthal 2018, 
p. 53). In the terms of the actualist HOT theory: whenever we have a thought to the 
effect that we, ourselves, are in a mental state M, we are in M. For instance: whenever 
we have a thought with the content ⟨I, myself, am seeing red⟩, we are seeing red. 
Why the actualist HOT theory would not accommodate intimacy? The objection 
runs thus (see McClelland 2020, p. 463; Rosenthal 2018, p. 54): if the higher-order state 
neither is identical nor belongs to the lower-order state, then we can err both with re-
spect to the properties of the lower-order state and with respect to the very existence 
of that state (i.e., inner misrepresentation can occur). As the actualist HOT theorist 
holds that the higher-order state neither is identical nor belongs to the lower-order 
state, on that theory we can err both with respect to the properties of the lower-order 
state and with respect to the very existence of that state. Therefore, the actualist HOT 
theory does not accommodate intimacy. 
What are the options for the actualist HOT theorist? Basically two: either to deny 
that there is something like intimacy or to find a way to accommodate intimacy wi-
thout abandoning her intuition—i.e., that the higher-order state neither is identical nor 
belongs to the lower-order state (claim (c) above). 
As for the first option, Rosenthal (2011) makes a suggestion. Consider the following 
two theses:  
 
(T1)  Whenever we are conscious of a mental state M, we are in M. 
(T2)  Whenever we are in a mental state M, we are conscious of M. 
  
Every higher-order theorist agrees that T2 is untenable. Now, according to Rosenthal 
(2011, p. 433), since T2 is untenable, we have “no reason to insist” that T1 is tenable. In 
his words: if it is true that “mental reality is to some extent independent of mental 
appearance”—unconscious states do occur—, then we have no reason to insist that 
mental appearance is dependent on mental reality—false higher-order states do occur. 
We rather “must” deny T1.  
22/28 
 
Is Rosenthal’s (2011) suggestion satisfying? It lends itself to two readings. First, Ro-
senthal is saying that the implausibility of T2 provides us with a reason against T1. 
However, one may reply that having an argument for or against the occurrence of un-
conscious states does not amount to having an argument for or against the occurrence 
of false higher-order states (and vice versa). The reason is simply that we are dealing 
with different (to be precise: converse) dependence relationships. On this reading, the 
suggestion is simply off the mark. On the second reading, Rosenthal is saying that the 
implausibility of T2 makes T1 groundless. We have no reason to hold the intimacy thesis 
to be true, or so the argument goes. However, this would leave the actualist HOT 
theory under the threat of the intimacy objection, for if the intimacy thesis turned out 
to be plausible, the actualist HOT theorist might still be asked to account for intimacy. 
On this reading, the suggestion is weak: to make the theory immune to the relevant 
threat, one has to show something more, namely, that T1 is untenable. Rosenthal (2005, 
2011, 2018) tries to do that as well. He attempts to show that there is nothing like 
intimacy. He points at cases that, to his eyes, are counter-examples to the intimacy 
thesis.29  
I do not want to critically assess Rosenthal’s counter-examples. Other scholars have 
already asked themselves whether Rosenthal’s cases admit of an interpretation on 
which no inner misrepresentation occurs (see, e.g., Kirkeby-Hinrup 2014, 2016). I ra-
ther want to explore the second option. Rosenthal (2018, p. 53) does that too. He rea-
sons as follows. Suppose there is something like intimacy. The actualist HOT theorist 
can accommodate it while still maintaining that the higher-order state neither is iden-
tical nor belongs to the lower-order state. He can do that by simply “adding a provision” 
to the theory. The provision precisely says that inner misrepresentation cannot occur. 
Such a move is supposed to satisfy the objector for the following reason: if it is true 
that the intimacy thesis is validated on independent grounds (for its friends: on intro-
spective grounds; see especially Kriegel 2009b; McClelland 2020), why should a theory 
of intransitive state consciousness accommodate it on his own? In other words: if the 
 
29 A case which Rosenthal (2005, pp. 209, 211–212, 2011, p. 436, 2018, p. 55) often advances is the pheno-
menon known as dental fear: we (only) have a thought to the effect that we, ourselves, are feeling pain 
but we are not feeling pain; rather we are just feeling vibration. The higher-order thought seems to be 
caused by the feeling of vibration plus fear. In general, the relevant cases have the following structure: 
we (only) have a thought to the effect that we are in M but we are not in M; rather we are in N—where 
M and N are first-order mental states. Here N occurs but M does not. Moreover, M is conscious but N 
is not. Thus, on the theory, not every conscious mental state is a state one is in: some conscious mental 
states occur (viz. exist), some do not. 
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intimacy issue is indeed independent of the question “what is it for a mental state to 
be conscious?”, why should a theory of state consciousness accommodate intimacy on 
his own? In Rosenthal’s words: 
 
Still, though higher-order theories do not on their own rule out such misrepresen-
tation, they also do not imply that it can, or ever does, occur. So if one did have 
suitable independent reason to think that it [= inner misrepresentation] cannot or 
never does occur, one could simply add that onto a higher-order theory without 
any problem. What is important here is that adding such a provision onto a higher-
order theory would doubtless not satisfy those who use misrepresentation by con-
sciousness as an objection to such theories. The question is why not. Adding on 
such a provision, especially if it were based on a suitable independent reason, de-
livers they [sic!] result the objectors ostensibly want. What more can they reaso-
nably demand? The quick answer is that these objectors regard no theory as sati-
sfactory unless it rules out misrepresentation on its own, without any added pro-
vision. But that just pushes the question back one step. If there is independent rea-
son to rule it out, why must a theory do so on its own, without appeal to any added 
provision? (Rosenthal 2018, p. 53) 
 
Can Rosenthal’s reply satisfy the objector? Rosenthal is certainly right in pointing out 
that the issue of misrepresentation goes beyond the core aim of the actualist HOT theory 
(where the core aim is to answer the question “what is it for a mental state to be 
conscious?” or “what is the difference between conscious and unconscious states?”).30 
Still, the actualist HOT theorist does commit herself to claims that go beyond the core 
aim of the theory, that is, (b) and (c). It is (c) that the friend of intimacy targets. Indeed 
(let M2 stand for the higher-order state and let M1 stand for the first-order one), friends 
of intimacy ask to provide them with a model of the relationship between the M2 and M1. 
Now, the actualist HOT theorist limits himself to saying that M2 is neither identical 
nor belongs to M1, whereas intimacy involves a “tie,” i.e., a dependence relationship 
between M2 and M1. As the model of the actualist HOT theorist does not reflect such a 
dependence, that model does not accommodate intimacy. To sum up, Rosenthal’s at-
tempt to accommodate intimacy is unsatisfactory in that he neglects to provide a mod-
 
30 Goldman’s (2002, p. 117) formulation of the theory is thus inaccurate. It is as follows: S’s M is conscious 
iff S has a thought to the effect that S is in M and S is in M. The second condition is not stated by the 
actualist HOT theorist.  
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el of the relationship between the higher-order and the lower-order state that satisfies 
the intimacy thesis. 
Friends of intimacy are right on what follows: a model that just says that M2 is di-
stinct from M1 or that even says that there is no dependence relationship between the 
two does not accommodate intimacy. Still, it seems that friends of intimacy make a 
further move; it seems that they claim that the only model that can accommodate inti-
macy is the following model: 
 
(~c)    Either M2 is identical to M2 or M2 belongs to M1. 
 
This is, in fact, the self-representationalist model (see Kriegel 2009b; McClelland 2020)—
what Rosenthal refers to as “the same-order theory.” On such models, higher-order 
states either are identical to the lower-order ones or are proper parts of them.  
Now our question is: is it true that the only model that accommodates intimacy is 
(~c)?(granted, merely for the sake of argument, that it does accommodate intimacy).31 
The answer is negative, I submit. The higher-order theorist can accommodate intimacy 
while still maintaining that M2 is neither identical nor belongs to M1. He can speculate 
as follows: 
 
(c+)    M1 belongs to M2. 
 
On such a model, M2 is neither identical nor belongs to M1, for a proper part of x cannot 
be identical to x (by the definition of proper parthood) and distinct things cannot be 
part of each other (by mereological anti-symmetry).32 Crucially, M2 cannot occur 
without M1’s occurring. This follows from a thesis that is not only intuitive but which 
has also been explicitly accepted by two renowned philosophers of mind: I refer to 
Brentano (1995, p. 71) and Husserl (2001, p. 21). According to this thesis, often referred 
to as “mereological essentialism” (Simons 2003), the existence of x implies the existence 
 
31 Weisberg (2008, pp. 166–179) and Rosenthal (2018, p. 51–52) argue that some self-representationalist 
models do not accommodate intimacy. For related discussion, see McClelland (2020, p. 476).  
32 An anonymous reviewer for this journal asks how this solution differs from Coleman’s (2015) “quo-
tational” HOT theory, which indeed seems to take M1 to be a proper part of M2 (see, e.g., Coleman 2015, 
p. 2727). My reply is twofold: first, my solution is different in that it does not employ the device of mental 
quotation. Second, it is different in that it does not abandon a representational view of transitive con-
sciousness—i.e., the idea that if x is conscious of y, then x represents y (see §2 above). For a critique of 
Coleman’s theory, see Rosenthal (2018, pp. 60–64). 
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of all of the proper parts of x.33 Mereological essentialism is not uncontroversial. Still, 
it is a lively option, one which also has a venerable tradition.34 
In conclusion, the actualist HOT theorist is in a position to reject the intimacy 
objection: even granting that there is something like intimacy, a model is available that 
at the same time preserves her intuition about the relationship between higher-order 
and lower-order states and accommodates intimacy. 
 
7   Results 
 
Overall, I have argued that four objections leveled at the actualist HOT theory are 
weak. I have named them the circularity objection, the first epistemic objection, the 
second epistemic objection, and the intimacy objection respectively. The first two ob-
jections turn out to be weak even on a conceptual reading of the theory. The circularity 
objection is weak because it is based either on a highly disputable view of concept 
entailment or a too demanding standard of informativeness (§3), whereas the first epi-
stemic objection is weak because the actualist HOT theorist may reject the thesis that 
when one’s mental state is conscious one automatically has good evidence for belie-
ving that that state is conscious (§4). As for the second epistemic objection, it is weak 
because indirect phenomenological evidence is an available evidential basis for the 
proposition that all conscious mental states are represented (§5). Finally, the intimacy 
objection is weak because a model is available that at the same time preserves the 
actualist HOT theorist’s intuition about the relationship between higher-order and 
lower-order states and accommodates intimacy, if any (§6). The actualist HOT theory 
may have some flaws, but it does not have the flaws that the aforementioned objections 






33 Less informally, mereological essentialism can be formulated as follows: if x exists and y is a proper 
part of x, then y exists. In this regard, note that (c+) does not contradict the claim that not all mental 
states are conscious—the main motivation behind higher-order theories. For from the claim that x is a 
proper part of y it does not follow that if x occurs, then y occurs.  
34 Mereological essentialism is associated with Chisholm but was already endorsed by Leibniz (see 
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